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Abstract  
While ‘good government’ has long been hailed as a defining feature of colonial Hong Kong, 
this paper argues that rather than assuming it as an effect from the adoption of particular 
British governing principles, it should be seen as an epistemological ordering frame whose 
existence relied upon constant processes of moralization undertaken by many actors across 
multiple scales. Central to this moralization was the invocation of certain ways of thinking 
about the roles of government and citizens that were implicit in Chinese historical experience. 
These existing moral constructs, transplanted and transformed within the institutional 
frameworks and emerging cultural milieu on colonial soil, became central elements in the 
way by which many British officials and Chinese residents came to express themselves, and 
by doing so constituted themselves as participating, governing subjects upholding colonial 
rule.  
 
To explore how these constructs were deployed in particular situated practices and functioned 
within broader strategies of colonial governance, this paper focuses on two case studies 
concerning the improvement of public health amidst growing threats of epidemics between 
1900 and 1908. Although these efforts were not successful in containing the spread of 
diseases, the emphasis on self-help and revival of ‘local traditions’ for encouraging people to 
improve their neighborhoods helped engender a sense of pride and solidarity amongst the 
Chinese residents and propagated the idea that despite under colonial domination, Hong Kong 
was an orderly, ‘civilized’ Chinese society that was superior to that of Mainland China itself. 
Although both case studies were drawn from particular local sites, it is clear that the initiation 
of the projects, the ways they were implemented and the responses to their outcomes were not 
confined to their local scales, but were tied to larger shifts in the forms of governance and 
emerging political discourses beyond Hong Kong. They thus highlight the ‘networks of 
multiple scales’ and the translocal processes through which competing conceptions of Hong 
Kong and its relations to ‘the world’ were actively being constructed by different actors under 
colonial rule. 
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For over half a century the Chinese in Hong Kong have enjoyed the fruits of 
strong, righteous and benevolent government…Under the British flag they 
have found perfect protection and liberty and from the government they have 
received equal justice and consideration. (Ho Kai, Chinese member of the 
Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1897).1 
 
It was due to Confucius that the laws governing the relationship of human 
society, as well as the principles and virtues still exist in China…the mind of 
the Chinese is still open to improvement; and China [is] still conscious of what 
is justice. (Lau Chu Pak, president of the Hong Kong Confucian Society, 
1911).2  
 
Now Hong Kong’s six hundred thousand residents live in relative comfort. 
This is due to good government. I earnestly hope that all of you consider the 
West and Hong Kong as your models in order that when you return to the 
motherland, you can help build a good government. (Sun Yat-sen, founder of 
the Republic of China, address to a group of Chinese students at The 
University of Hong Kong, 1923).3  
 
Speaking to a group of Chinese students at The University of Hong Kong in 1923, Sun Yat-
sen, the founding father of the Republic of China, praised the British administration for its 
governing capabilities, particularly for instilling order and civility in this prosperous colony.4 
Sun credited Hong Kong for nurturing his revolutionary ideas while he was a student there, 
particularly in relation to the imperative of the rule of law, respect for justice and good 
government -- all key elements that he believed were necessary for the making of a 
harmonious, modern society.5 While Sun identified these elements in British Hong Kong, he 
believed they were fully compatible with the traditional Confucian ideal of social order built 
upon a benevolent government and virtuous citizens. In this regard, Hong Kong was 
considered a model from which Chinese people could rediscover their own cultural values 
and develop themselves into self-conscious, responsible citizens capable of building a strong 
Chinese nation.6  
 
Sun’s admiration of Hong Kong was somewhat ironic given his tense relationship with the 
colonial regime, which had previously banished him from the territory for his revolutionary 
activities that were deemed detrimental to British imperial interests.7 But what Sun 
emphasized in his relation to the territory was a set of moral attributes that were in his eyes 
universal(izable) and separable from Britain’s imperial aggression. Although he had spoken 
out against the injustice of colonialism in general terms, Hong Kong was undoubtedly to Sun 
a more well-governed Chinese society than that of Mainland China itself, where the pervasion 
of corruption at all levels of the government had made the nurturing of ‘public spirit’ 
impossible.8 His sentiment was shared by many Chinese social reformers with different 
political views.9 Indeed, the idea of Hong Kong as a ‘land of justice and civility’ has been a 
recurring theme in descriptions of the territory.10 And this extends to contemporary writings 
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about the city, which overwhelmingly emphasize the longstanding benefits from the adoption 
of British policy and legal framework, which were fully embraced by the Hong Kong Chinese 
and were rightly preserved after the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China in 1997.11  
 
Despite these consistently positive, overarching narratives, it is worth noting that the day-to-
day life in early Hong Kong was rife with tensions. News headlines in the early twentieth 
century abound with reports of crime of all sorts. Corruption in many government 
departments was rampant. And although the British lauded their ‘laissez-faire’ polices for 
ensuring ‘market freedom’ for all, they also enacted many forms of discriminatory legislation 
to protect European privilege.12 Yet, the persistence of inequality and social tensions did not, 
for the most part, incite sustained criticisms against the colonial regime. A common 
explanation for this ‘consent’ was that a majority of Chinese in Hong Kong were, like their 
European counterparts, preoccupied with making as much money as possible before returning 
to their permanent homelands. Indeed, the colony’s transient population provided a key 
justification for the British to retain authoritarian rule, which was deemed necessary for 
protecting ‘the best interests’ of a people with little sense of belonging to this territory.13 
 
While the transient character of early Hong Kong might had tempered local political 
participation, it does not explain the Chinese insistence of Hong Kong as a model of 
governance and the sense of pride often attached to their narratives. Indeed, a closer look at 
the opinion pieces circulating in Hong Kong and Canton’s popular press in the early twentieth 
century suggests the existence of a counter discourse which subverted common ascriptions of 
the Hong Kong people as apathetic subjects indifferent to everything aside from improving 
their own economic standing.14 Rather, as this paper attempts to show, all constituencies 
imbricated under the colonial system played an active, self-conscious role in the shaping of 
policy practice and rationality of governance. Although all colonial projects, as Philip Howell 
points out, were by necessity and by design ‘forwarded’ by the British Empire to its localities, 
they were always appropriated or circumscribed to meet emerging demands under specific 
circumstances.15 Attempts to regulate the colonial urban order were certainly of a piece with 
the values and culture of the British society of the time. Yet the actual construction of this 
order was never a straightly top down exercise, but was always enabled by ‘multiple sources 
of power and multiple lines of affiliations’ that traversed across disparate territories.16 It is for 
this reason that we need to consider the specific histories and geographies of Hong Kong, 
including especially how subjects of various origins came to act on, resist or reinforce the 
rules and regulations that were imposed on them by appealing to certain truth claims 
produced out of these interactions. This is also to suggest the need to pay attention to the 
interaction between different scales, namely the colonial, the ‘local,’ the regional, as well as 
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multiple imaginaries of an emerging Chinese nation.17 As Stephen Legg has succinctly argued, 
although scales often appear as ahistorical ‘frameworks,’ they were fought over as techniques 
of spatial governmentalities and functioned through their impacts on political practice.18 The 
task of the critical scholar thus is to ‘reveal the historically specific experiences, effects and 
affects of scale and the different forms of capital through which they are produced.’  
 
This paper is an attempt to address some aspects of Hong Kong’s colonial governmentality19 
by examining different scalar processes through which British officials and Hong Kong 
Chinese participated in the construction of a narrative of ‘good government,’ which came to 
function as a form of moral regulation and means of political legitimation in the early 
twentieth century. It should be noted here that although it deals with the concept of ‘good 
government,’ the focus is not on the ‘moral basis’ of the state, but on practices of 
moralization and how the varied languages of truth produced out of these processes 
contributed to the formation of a particular kind of ‘moral subject.’ While good government 
has long been hailed as a defining feature of colonial Hong Kong,20 this paper argues that, 
rather than assuming it as an effect from the adoption of particular governing principles, it 
should be seen as an epistemological ordering frame whose existence relied upon constant 
processes of moralization undertaken by many actors. More specifically, this moralization 
involved the invocation of certain ways of thinking about the roles of government and citizens 
that were implicit in Chinese historical experience. These existing moral constructs, 
transplanted and transformed within the institutional frameworks and emerging cultural 
milieu on colonial soil, became central elements in the way by which many British officials 
and Chinese residents came to express themselves, and by doing so constituted themselves as 
participating, governing subjects buttressing colonial rule.  
 
To explore how these constructs were deployed in particular situated practices and operated 
as scalar epistemologies within broader strategies of colonial governance over time, I focus 
on two case studies concerning the improvement of public health amidst growing threats of 
epidemics between 1900 and 1908. This was an unstable period that saw a surge of anti-
foreign sentiments instigated by political crisis in Mainland China.21 Yet, British governors in 
Hong Kong generally enjoyed wide popularity amongst the local Chinese. My contention is 
that this contradiction can only be explained by considering the complex affiliations between 
the Chinese residents, the colonial regime and authorities in Mainland China, as well as how 
ongoing reflective comparisons of Hong Kong with its neighboring territories contributed to 
the construction of a particular discourse of difference. While not refuting that Hong Kong 
had always been a distinct polity under colonial rule, it is argued here that its ‘difference’ was 
achieved not so much by the enactment of policies, but by ongoing scaling practices through 
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which certain representations of the territory and their relations with the wider region were 
reified.22 
 
My first case study revisits a plague prevention campaign initiated by Governor Henry Blake 
(1898-1903), who worked with factions of the Chinese community to mobilize local residents 
to improve the sanitary condition of a poor disease-ridden neighborhood.  Although the 
campaign was ultimately unsuccessful in deterring the return of epidemics (which continued 
to ravage the colony until the mid-1920s), the emphasis on self-reliance in overcoming the 
public health crisis and revival of the traditional Chinese neighborhood system for organizing 
collective action helped garner a sense of pride and solidarity amongst the residents whilst 
consolidating the hierarchical structure within the Chinese constituency. It also greatly 
boosted Blake’s standing as a ‘benevolent’ ruler that fit with Chinese expectation of a ‘good 
official.’ Along with other projects, this neighborhood campaign constituted a larger scalar 
shift of colonial governance that depended less on coercion but self-regulation, where a 
growing number of ‘traditional’ philanthropic institutions and neighborhood organizations 
began to assume the responsibility of monitoring sanitary work in different parts of Hong 
Kong. Central to this shift was the proliferation of moralizations that linked sanitation with 
‘public virtues,’ and a gradual normalization of particular moral conduct reflecting traditional 
‘Confucian values’ to which all Chinese were assumed to subscribe. 
 
The second case examines the work of a commission appointed by Governor Matthew Nathan 
(1904-1907) to investigate widespread corruption in the administration of public health 
legislation. Whilst the investigation itself had little effect in stemming corruption, it 
strengthened the social position of the ‘leading Chinese,’ who managed to persuade a 
substantial number of their countrymen to confess their crimes through a combination of 
‘moral bullying’ and offers of promised benefits. The assumed roles of these Chinese as 
‘guardians of public goods’ and their cozy relations with top-ranked officials not only helped 
restore some credibility to the colonial regime, but also further promoted the image of Hong 
Kong as a ‘beacon of civilization,’ a claim that fed into an emerging political discourse that 
posited the colony as an appropriate model for social and political reform for Mainland China. 
Meanwhile, in a different ‘scaling out’ process, the ongoing challenge in enforcing sanitary 
regulations revealed by the commission provided new sources for people in other colonial 
territories, most notably Singapore, to criticize the administrative structures of their own 
governments that went beyond the legislation of public health.  
 
Although both case studies were relatively unknown episodes drawn from particular local 
sites, it is clear that the initiation of these projects, the ways they were implemented and the 
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responses to their outcomes were not confined to their local scales, but were tied to larger 
shifts in the forms of governance and emerging political discourses beyond Hong Kong. They 
thus highlight the ‘networks of multiple scales’ and the translocal processes through which 
competing conceptions of Hong Kong and its relations to ‘the world’ were actively being 
constructed.23 To further consider these connected trajectories, the last section discusses how 
the Hong Kong model of ‘good government’ espoused in the popular press in Hong Kong and 
Canton was increasingly used as a key reference for denouncing the corrupt Qing authority in 
the years leading up to the Chinese revolution in 1911. The moral imperatives of ‘benevolent 
officials’ and ‘virtuous citizens’ that were repeatedly affirmed in each of these narratives 
were simultaneously being mapped out in an imaginative geography that linked Hong Kong 
with its neighboring Chinese province of Guangdong, conjuring a regional representation of 
‘Cantonese civility’ that challenged the longstanding assumptions of Hong Kong’s ties with 
the British empire and Chinese nation.  
 
 
Private Interests Versus Public Goods: The Regulation of Health and the Protection of 
‘Hong Kong’s Interests’  
 
It is not accidental that the narrative of ‘good government’ in Hong Kong arose amidst 
growing concern over the threat of epidemics across the British Empire in the nineteenth 
century. The emerging belief that health and productivity of populations could be optimized 
by positive environmental settings provided new impetus for urban reforms, most notably in 
the expansion of urban services and introduction of building standards that would impart new 
‘sanitary norms.’24 Yet the advent of public health improvement was highly contested affair. 
As recent research has made clear, the now widely praised Chadwickean sanitary reforms, 
which involved heavy expenditure and state intervention, were constantly being challenged 
for their rationality and practicality when first introduced.25 Resistance to public health 
projects was steadfast in the colonies, where gaps in cultural practices and mistrust between 
native residents and colonial officials incited ongoing tensions and conflicts.26 Many 
improvement schemes were also deterred by vested interests, particularly in places where 
governments derived significant tax revenue from housing properties, a condition that made 
officials reluctant to enforce stringent regulatory measures that would cause dissention 
amongst native landlords.27 While the contradictory needs of securing economic vitality and 
public health posed practical challenges for managing the urban order, they also prompted the 
production of new claims for justifying these competing agendas. And despite the 
discrimination they often experienced in the colonial situation, many indigenous people 
sought to appeal to the logics of colonial capitalism, particularly the need to ensure ‘market 
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freedom’ and limit governmental power as a means to advance their economic interests.28 As 
with other universalist discourses such as those of public health and urban reform, these 
appeals can be seen as attempts to rescale the colonial hierarchy by envisaging a different 
kind of urban order in which relations between the colonial state and its subjects would be 
altered. But to understand the ways in which these contestations unfolded, it is necessary to 
consider the specific historical contexts that gave shape to existing relations of power.  
 
Often deemed as the most ‘laissez-faire’ colony amongst Britain’s imperial possessions, Hong 
Kong’s economic growth had long relied on Chinese investment, which outnumbered that of 
British and Europeans by the last quarter of the nineteenth century.29 This was particularly the 
case in housing properties, where the government and property owners were both able to 
derive large profits thanks to a peculiar land system that severely restricted land supplies and 
artificially elevated land values.30 These property relations significantly influenced the mode 
of urban development, which was characterized by its lax regulation, exorbitantly high rent 
and overcrowded conditions. In the wake of widespread epidemic outbreaks elsewhere in the 
late nineteenth century, the colonial government conducted a series of enquiries into the 
colony’s housing problems and introduced several public health bills aimed at improving 
sanitary standards in the working class districts.31 However, all of these proposals were either 
turned down by the legislative council or significantly modified to exclude the most stringent 
measures due to vehement opposition from property owners.32 Meanwhile, many initiatives in 
urban services such as the provision of universal water supplies were hampered by the lack of 
public funds and corruption associated with their administration. And the same pattern 
persisted even after the disastrous 1894 bubonic plague outbreak, which killed a large number 
of Chinese inhabitants in overcrowded tenements.33  
 
Notwithstanding the vested interests implicated in the legislative impasse, debates over 
sanitary reform rarely addressed the systemic nature of the problem, but tended to focus on 
the ‘moral failures’ of particular groups to safeguard the ‘public good.’ Colonial 
administrators, for example, blamed the delays in health legislation on the “profiteering 
mentality” of landlords, who were only concerned with maximizing their rental returns with 
no regards for public welfare.34 The British merchants, on the contrary, saw the problem as 
one of a combination of ‘Chinese ignorance’ and ‘officialdom,’ and argued that management 
of urban affairs would be made more efficient by placing them under a British-controlled 
municipal council, such as those already established in other colonial territories.35 But their 
request was repeatedly ruled out by the Colonial Office, which alleged the arrangement to be 
unjust because it would allow a small oligarchy of British taxpayers to rule over a large 
number of Chinese, who held a majority of property holdings in the colony.36 The 
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government’s fashioning of itself as the guardian of justice and protector of ‘Chinese interests’ 
would also become a standard rationale for deferring political reform throughout the colonial 
period. And this claim was proudly interpreted by some British historians as evidence of the 
benevolent ‘humanitarian liberalism that characterized British colonial policies.’37  
 
While this kind of rhetoric was, to a degree, self-serving, it is worth noting that colonial 
administrators had always sought to consciously distinguish their positions from those of the 
local British and European residents. By proclaiming that it was their duty to defend the 
‘larger’ economic interest and social wellbeing of the ‘Hong Kong community,’ these 
officials sought to assume a moral high ground that they believed would give legitimacy to a 
non-representative, authoritarian government. And the history of Hong Kong seems to 
suggest they were able to do this with considerable success, not least due to the support from 
the Chinese, who were generally less critical of the officials, particularly the governors and 
top-rank administrators, than the local Europeans.38  The question that arises here, then, is 
what enabled the Chinese to arrive at this ‘consent,’ and in what ways did their views 
resonate with those of the colonial regime. Certainly this question demands an answer that 
looks beyond the familiar explanations predicated on the colony’s ‘transient nature’ or the 
merits of British humanitarianism. I posit that it would be more fruitful to examine how 
certain political and cultural discourses were invoked and put to use and how people 
implicated in these processes came to make sense of them. This perspective requires 
connecting two aspects in the study of governmentality outlined in the introduction of this 
special issue: the ways in which authorities seek to shape the conduct of subjects, and the 
multiple ways people came to regulate their actions on their own terms.  
 
In his study of the history of colonial governance in Hong Kong, Steve Tsang attributes the 
high degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the British administration to the modern civil service 
system, which was first established in 1862 through the introduction of the ‘cadet scheme.’39 
Tsang argues that because many characteristics of the cadets (who typically occupied top-
ranked positions in the colonial administration), such as impartiality, integrity and 
commitment to public interests, paralleled the Chinese concepts of good governance, they 
were able to convince the native Chinese of their roles as ‘benevolent rulers.’40 While Tsang 
usefully points to the confluence of ‘moral values’ developed in two different contexts, it is 
worth considering more specifically how these ‘values’ – or more appropriately ‘moral 
constructs’ -- were deployed in particular moralizing narratives through which they came to 
function as anchors of political legitimacy.  As their genesis and evolution makes clear, these 
constructs were neither timeless nor unanimously endorsed by all. Rather, as the case studies 
of this paper illustrate, they were actively propagated by Chinese elites and British officials as 
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a means to cultivate loyalties and reinforce social hierarchies in Hong Kong’s colonial 
context. 
 
The first of these key constructs was shanzheng (善政), which was a longstanding Confucian 
moral discourse referring to the policies of a benevolent government. Officials who governed 
with shanzheng were depicted as just, righteous rulers that concerned themselves with ‘the 
regulation of the livelihood of their subjects.’41 As James Gregor has noted, in Confucian 
moral philosophy a good ruler regards the assurance of material wellbeing of his subjects a 
priority because it was the basis for the cultivation of the propriety and good conduct that in 
turn enabled social peace. And in a peaceful society, every citizen enters into reciprocal 
obligations with respect to one’s immediate family, with one’s superiors, and, through them, 
the state.42  To a significant degree, many British governors seemed to have fulfilled the role 
of benevolent ruler in the eyes of the Hong Kong Chinese, and in this way were able to rise 
above subordinate officials and establish a level of trust with their colonial subjects, to an 
extent unsullied by the problems and corruption of day-to-day administration. 
 
Closely related to shanzheng was the idea of gongde (公德), which refers to the virtues of 
good citizens. Because material wellbeing being was considered to be the basis of the 
cultivation of proper conduct and morals, those who already possessed wealth and power 
were expected to display generosity and kindness towards the poor, to lend a helping hand to 
the disadvantaged and transmit their grievances to higher authorities.43 In late imperial China, 
this role was largely assumed by local gentry-elites who participated in philanthropic 
activities that also served as a means to enhance their social positions within a highly 
decentralized administrative structure.44 While there were no traditional gentry-elites with 
official titles in Hong Kong’s immigrant society, the British’s need to recruit local leaders to 
help maintain social peace provided a space for Chinese merchants to step in as middlemen.45 
In time, these merchants came to assume an important role in mediating relations between the 
colonial administration and the large number of laborers and actively cultivated their image as 
respectable, virtuous citizens. They also set up philanthropic organizations that offered social 
services for the community and raised relief funds for natural disasters. These include most 
notably the Tung Wah Hospital, whose charity work would in time expand to Mainland China 
and overseas and became a matter of collective pride for the Hong Kong Chinese.46 The 
moral leadership of the elite directors of Tung Wah and other philanthropic associations was 
also boosted by the personal patronage of the governors and other top-ranked officials, who 
looked to these institutions as an important bridge between the government and the 
governed.47 
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By associating its governance with the Chinese concept of shanzheng then, the colonial 
authority was able to make a normative claim on the allegiance of the ‘better class Chinese,’ 
who in turn portrayed themselves as the champions of gongde, and in this capacity of the 
leaders for the Chinese ‘everyman’ who should support this benevolent exercise of power. 
The Chinese merchant elites, in committing themselves to channel grievances and improve 
the livelihood for the average person, allowed the latter to be relieved of having to deal with 
colonial officials and instead take the cue from their fellow countrymen. While this 
arrangement strengthened the vertical hierarchy within the Chinese community, it 
simultaneously created a new sense of solidarity that enabled Chinese of different ‘classes’ to 
identify with each other as having shared interests, and by doing so contributed to the 
construction of difference that readily fed into a racially divided colonial society. At the same 
time, the emphasis of a generalized ‘Chinese moral subject’ with a shared Confucian tradition 
also helped encourage people to participate in their own governance, in turn providing a 
means of stabilizing the ‘benevolent (colonial) state.’48   
 
It should be emphasized again here that by foregrounding the term ‘good government,’ the 
attempt is not to reaffirm the success and achievements of the Hong Kong colonial 
administration, but to elucidate the dialogic process through which different constituencies 
participated in colonial governance in accord with their own motivations. What is important, 
to follow David Scott’s discussion of colonial governmentality, is thus not so much about 
discerning whether native people were included or excluded in particular policies or projects, 
but to identify the emergence of new ‘political games’ that both the ‘colonizers’ and the 
‘colonized’ were obliged to play across multiple terrains if they were to be counted as 
political.49 After all the apparatus of colonial states, as Nicholas Rose contends, had neither 
the unity nor functionality that were often ascribed to them.50 The ‘power of the state’ was 
never a given, but always an outcome of the assembling of different actors, ideas and 
relations of authorities into seemingly durable constructs that came to be largely taken for 
granted.  
 
Some of these dynamics will be explored in the next section, which examines the roles of 
British officials and different sections of the Chinese community in an effort to prevent 
epidemic outbreaks and improve public health. By focusing on a particular intervention in 
sanitary practices in one small neighborhood in Hong Kong, it provides an example of how 
the discourse of ‘good government’ operated with the support of multiple actors implicated in 
the process, as well as how it constituted a particular scalar dynamic of colonial governance 
which began to rely increasingly on the self-regulation of colonial subjects. It also illustrates 
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how the mutual legitimation of colonial authorities and Chinese elites, while symbiotic, was 
always being reconfigured in response to emerging demands that were specific in time and 
place.  
 
 
Cultivating ‘Public Spirits’: Henry Blake’s Plague Prevention Campaign  
 
The outbreak of the bubonic plague in 1894 precipitated one of the most severe political and 
economic crises in Hong Kong’s history. As in other cities hit by epidemics at this time, the 
outbreak led to widespread speculation over the causes of disease and much finger pointing at 
those held responsible for the catastrophe.51 To contain the spread of disease, sanitary 
authorities imposed militant measures to remove patients from their homes and took over 
many infected houses, leading to the eviction of thousands of tenants.52 These actions 
spawned widespread anger amongst the Chinese community and demands from landlords for 
compensation to cover their lost rent.53 While many Europeans blamed the Chinese for 
causing the plague due to their ‘insanitary practices,’ British merchants stepped up their 
pressure on the government to relinquish the management of urban affairs to a popular-
elected municipal council.54 By the late 1890s, the health conditions of the city remained dire. 
The plague was returning annually and severely hampering the colonial economy. An earlier 
proposal to systematically rebuild insanitary houses was shelved due to large expenses that 
would be incurred from compensation to the landlords.55 A commission in 1897 reported that 
many Chinese tenements remained overcrowded and unfit for human habitation, and that the 
provision of markets, latrines, bathhouses and other amenities essential for public health were 
insufficient for the need of its rapidly expanding population.56  
 
This was the bleak scenario that Henry Blake encountered when he arrived in Hong Kong to 
begin his governorship in 1898. Adhering to the familiar discourse of ‘British justice,’ Blake 
was adamant that management of urban affairs must not be placed in the hand of a self-
serving, British-controlled municipal council that was unable to safeguard the long-term 
interests of Hong Kong. The British merchants nevertheless continued to pursue their cause, 
and had several times complained to the Colonial Office of the continual failures of the Blake 
administration to improve the colony’s sanitary conditions.57 The ensuing bitter exchanges 
between Blake and the merchants eventually led the Colonial Office to order an external 
inquiry that ended in the passing of major public health legislation that brought in sweeping 
new regulation.58 However, as will be discussed later on in this paper, their impact was 
significantly blunted by widespread corruption that debilitated their enforcement. 
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It is worth noting, however, that despite the complaints of the merchants, Blake had actually 
put in much effort to tackle disease prevention throughout his tenure. The lack of attention to 
his work in many historical accounts could be because he was ultimately unsuccessful in 
preventing the return of epidemics.59 However, a closer look at his initiatives in public health 
improvement and the responses they generated amongst the wider community can bring to 
light not only their significance at the time, but also the longer term processes through which 
particular ideas developed across multiple spatial networks were translated and put to use in 
local practices, as well as how these projects themselves became sources for reformulating 
urban policy as part of a larger scalar shift of colonial governmentality.   
 
As evident in archival records, one consistent aspect that defined Blake’s approach to colonial 
governance was the need to adapt British policies to local conditions and cultural practices.60 
While he was commended by many of his contemporaries for his brilliant governing skills 
and humanitarian inclinations, his invocation of ‘localism’ followed existing discourses of 
cultural relativism and political pragmatism that had long been advocated in British imperial 
policies.61 The rationale behind his improvement schemes in Hong Kong predicated on 
soliciting Chinese cooperation was also significantly shaped by his earlier governing 
experience, most notably that in Bahamas, where he had gained renown by improving the 
sanitation of local villages by training native leaders to help organize the cleaning of wells 
and drains.62 The positive result of his project further convinced Blake that the ultimate 
success of battling diseases would depend on the extent to which the Chinese taking matters 
into their own hands. And what was crucial, to use Blake’s own words, was ‘to put people 
into the right spirits’ so that they would not only comply but actively uphold the regulation of 
public health.63 While this inculcation of conduct clearly follows a central theme in the 
development of bio-politics in the late nineteenth century onward, its advent depended not 
only on implementing the ‘right’ policies, but also the extent to which these policies 
resonated with local ways of thinking and practices.64 As a member of the civil service whose 
own subjectivity had been shaped by his transnational experience of Empire, Blake sought to 
translate his successes elsewhere to the context of Hong Kong, and in the process also 
adapted his own thinking and refined his strategies in dealing with the native Chinese. With 
this in mind it would be useful, before proceeding to discuss Blake’s plague prevention 
campaign, to first consider some of the ways the Chinese thought about the health crisis and 
their own moralizations about the problems in relation to the regulations imposed by the 
colonial administration.  
 
As in other colonies, sanitary reports produced by medical experts in Hong Kong typically 
emphasized Chinese ignorance of hygiene, which was seen as the main reason they resisted 
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regulations that were deemed necessary to improve their health and prevent diseases.65 But 
closer attendance to historical details does not seem to fully support this perspective. As even 
some officials acknowledged in private correspondence, that the attitudes of the Chinese were 
in reality more ambivalent.66 While cultural divides concerning health practices certainly 
existed, many poor Chinese tenement dwellers were not against improving their living 
conditions, particularly the provision of better urban services such as water supplies.67 And 
although landlords generally opposed the application of building codes that would cause a 
reduction in their rental income, they were supportive of the expansion of public 
infrastructure and were rightly fearful about the outbreak of epidemics in their own 
neighborhoods. These somewhat complex attitudes toward sanitary improvement were 
reflected in many articles in the Chinese newspapers. In contrast to the English press that 
focused critiques primarily on Chinese ignorance and official arrogance, these writings tended 
to moralize the issues by entreating officials to soften their highhanded measures on the one 
hand, and on the other urging the Chinese laboring class, often in paternalistic tones, to 
cooperate with the colonial authority by reporting plague cases.68  
 
Chinese resistance to reporting plague cases had indeed been a significant obstacle to 
enforcing sanitary regulations. The main reason for this reluctance was that once a household 
was reported to contain a plague patient, it would be subjected immediately to forced 
disinfection by the sanitary department.  The disinfecting process caused much dissention, not 
only because it often damaged people’s belongings, but also because bribes (called 
‘squeezes’) were regularly demanded by government inspectors and other subordinate 
workers. 69 The avoidance of being identified as a plague household had two major 
consequences. One was the increased dumping of dead patients on the streets at night.70 The 
other was the refusal to participate in rat-catching, an exercise encouraged by the government, 
which regularly supplied free rat-traps to each house in the Chinese district.71 Reports showed 
that many of these traps were intentionally left sprung, because the finding of an infected rat 
would result in the same disinfection process that followed the discovery of a plague patient. 
The government would later try to provide other incentives to capture rats that resulted in 
some amusing unintended consequences. For example, the offer of a payment of two cents 
per rat caught immediately resulted in a large number of returns. But subsequently it became 
apparent that the numbers were swollen by the importation of dead rats from neighboring 
province of Guangdong for the sake of the reward, fueling a newly flourished transnational 
trade. The discovery of the trade incited further condemnation from the local British and 
Europeans of the Chinese’s ‘profiteering mentality’ and lack of moral conscience.72 
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In contrary to these accusations, the problems of sanitary regulation were not lost in 
discussions amongst the Chinese themselves. Newspapers circulating in Hong Kong and 
Canton had published a handful of thoughtful articles calling people to cooperate with the 
colonial administration in fighting epidemics. An example was a 1901 leading article 
appeared in the widely circulated Tsun Wan Yat Po.73 Titled ‘Reflections on plague 
prevention and ways to tranquilize the minds of the people,’ the article began by explaining in 
details why Chinese tended to evade particular regulations. ‘Chinese people hate trouble,’ it 
contended, ‘and their fear of hospitals, of disinfection, of putting lime into their coffins… 
made them look to government officials as aggressors and enemies…and thus in desperation 
they fled, lied and even left the dead bodies of their family members in the streets.’ The 
article then asserted, however, that while their resistance was understandable, every Chinese 
was at heart deeply ashamed of these actions because they violated the age-old tradition of 
respecting the deceased. The article ended by a polemic appeal to the governor to exercise his 
shanzheng by lifting the most stringent regulation and punishment for noncompliance. In this 
way, not only would it be more effective to prevent diseases, but also that ‘the living would 
be pleased and the dead be at rest, and both would be without sorrow and the living would 
offer endless thanks.’74  
 
Though it is unclear to what extent the editorial policy of the newspaper was directed by those 
supporting the colonial administration, it nevertheless elucidates a particular paternalistic 
approach adopted by some of the Chinese towards solving the sanitary problems. Similarly 
polemical pieces can also be found in the popular press, with many of which assuming a 
moral high ground that mixed statements urging all Chinese to ‘act according to their 
conscience’ and pledging the government to soften the regulatory measures.75 It is notable 
that the colonial governor was always portrayed in these writings as an individual with a 
moral force that stood above other subordinate officials, and who could, if necessary, act 
alone to correct their wrongs. And indeed, as mentioned earlier, many Hong Kong governors 
seem to have made conscious efforts to fit themselves into this assumed benevolent role, 
which in turn helped to neutralize some of the antagonism between Chinese residents and the 
colonial officials responsible for day to day administration. Blake’s campaign to rally the 
Chinese to improve the conditions of a plague-ridden neighborhood illustrates a particular 
working out of the logics of these relationships.  
 
In spring 1903, Blake requested the Sanitary Board to transfer the management of two 
tenement blocks to him over three months in the summer, a time when the plague was 
expected to return to the colony. Blake stated that the goal of the campaign was to conduct an 
experiment to encourage Chinese residents to sanitize their own houses in the absence of 
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government officials. If successful, it would provide an object lesson to motivate individuals 
to help themselves and others and culminate in a sense of enhanced “public spirit” for 
securing the larger interest of Hong Kong.76 
 
The two experimental blocks, which comprised 253 tenement floors with 7,700 tenants, were 
located at Second and Third Streets of the Western District, a grossly crowded neighborhood 
with the worst record of epidemics in the city.77 Drawing from his earlier work in the 
Bahamas where he solicited support from local community leaders, Blake began by asking 
volunteers from the residents to form a kaifong (street committee), to take on the task of 
supervising the sanitary operation. Although it did not exist previously in this neighborhood, 
the kaifong was actually a traditional, informal Chinese governing unit that was already 
present in other parts of Hong Kong.78 Members of the kaifong were typically ‘civic-minded, 
status-seeking, and paternalistic citizens’ that volunteered themselves to offer service to the 
community.79 While they were not necessarily wealthy, kaifong members were involved in 
nominating the directors of more prestigious Chinese institutions such as the Tung Wah 
Hospital, and thus were attached to the existing power structure of the community. Blake’s 
request drew an immediate positive response, with more than a dozen men stepping forward 
to form the new kaifong to lead the campaign. The project also obtained support from a 
number of prominent Chinese leaders, including two members of the Sanitary Board, Ho Kai 
and Fung Wah Chun, as well as Ho Kam Tong, a well known philanthropist who was a 
director of the Tung Wah Hospital and comprador of the British trading firm Jardine 
Matheson.80 To express his good will, Ho Kam Tong donated a sum of money to the 
campaign to alleviate the hardship of those who contracted diseases.81 Aside from these 
individuals, Blake also negotiated with several property owners in the neighborhood to have 
their properties evacuated for use as community washhouses. These spaces would be 
provided with hot water tanks and residents would organize themselves to systematically 
bring their clothing and furniture for cleansing. To encourage the voluntary reporting of 
sickness, Blake promised that houses of plague patients would not need to go through the 
usual disinfection process. Furthermore, patients would be offered medical service either by 
European or Chinese doctors, whichever they preferred, in their own homes free of charge.82 
 
The plague returned as expected soon after the campaign kicked off in the summer. But 
although a large number of residents fell victim to disease, the collective cleansing operation 
went on with rigor. To offer further encouragement to the residents, Blake and the Chinese 
leaders frequently visited the district together and provided occasions for the local press to 
promote the project in glowing terms. As the plague began to subside toward the end the 
summer, Blake proclaimed that his experiment was decidedly a success. Even though 
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epidemics continued to ravage the area, not a single dead body was found on the street during 
the period and residents were willingly reporting sickness not least due to the access of free 
medical services offered to them. More surprising perhaps was that the landlords who 
evacuated their properties for use as community washhouses turned down the governor’s 
offer of compensation to cover their lost rent, asserting proudly that there was nothing more 
meaningful to them than ‘contributing to the noble cause of plague prevention.’83 Indeed, 
goodwill from the campaign presented a sharp contrast against the stereotype of Chinese 
landlords caring nothing but money with no regard whatsoever for public welfare. And this 
was further played out in a lavish public ceremony at the conclusion of the campaign, where 
the Chinese leaders and kaifong members took turns to shower praises to each other for their 
gongde and to thank the governor for his shanzheng, meanwhile vowing they would give their 
all to combat the plague upon its return in the future.  
 
Although the positive outcome of the campaign owed much to the personal efforts of Blake 
and the Chinese leaders, it needs to be contextualized within regional networks of authorities 
beyond Hong Kong. As Alan Baumler notes, popular campaigns initiated from the top had 
many precedents in late imperial China.84 While campaigns were an effective way to 
accomplish a great deal in a short time, they also had limitations. Campaign successes 
typically depended on the support of gentry-elites who were accustomed to manage local 
affairs in a highly decentralized political system. These leaders cultivated loyalty from the 
poorer class by offering them money and community services. The case in Hong Kong 
reflected these relationships with a support network system comprised of key local 
institutions including the kaifong and the more prestigious organizations such as the Tung 
Wah Hospital that served to enhance the power and benevolent image of the Chinese leaders. 
Although this kind of network originated from the Mainland, when transplanted to Hong 
Kong they became key anchors of colonial rule and served to strengthen the mutual 
dependence between the British administration and Chinese merchant elites.85 This sort of 
patron-client relationship also explains in part why the Chinese often preferred to advance 
their political and social status through these informal networks rather than by agitating for 
more fundamental political reforms. In doing so, however, they also reinforced the Confucian 
discourse of social hierarchy and moral claim upon the populace that being a ‘good citizen’ 
(via local structures) entailed following particular kind of ‘virtuous’ practices.  
 
The revisit of this little-known historical episode provides more general insights into the 
relationship between the colonial state and the Chinese subjects, which depended on the 
entrenchment of local institutions in the governing structure. Blake’s plague prevention 
campaign, which was based on the idea of cultural relativism promoted in British imperial 
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policies, provided a prime occasion for the Chinese merchants to espouse their moral 
leadership and legitimize their role as representatives of the community. And even though it 
was initiated at the top and was led by the elites and kaifong leaders, the campaign helped 
created to a certain extent a solidarity amongst different groups within the Chinese 
constituency. The idea that Chinese people could organize themselves to improve their living 
conditions in lieu of formal official supervision also helped garner a sense of collective pride, 
as well as contributed to the construction of a generalized ‘Chinese moral subject’ predicated 
on self-governance. However, the fact these assertions were made possible only in a colonial 
territory also created a kind of double irony: The first was the strengthening of conservatism 
centering on ‘Chinese tradition’ and rigid social hierarchy in Hong Kong at a time when 
many intellectuals in China were pushing for radical social reforms. And second, it 
engendered a sense of sustained superiority amongst the Hong Kong Chinese vis-à-vis their 
Mainland counterparts.86  
 
While this one-off campaign was confined to a small district and did not prevent the plague 
from returning in the following years, it did lead to a number of lasting changes not only in 
policies but also more generally in the (self)regulation of day-to-day practices, all of which 
could be seen as belonging to a larger scalar shift in the rationality of  colonial governance. 
The cleansing operation carried out by the residents themselves was made into a permanent 
policy in 1904, requiring inhabitants of all tenements throughout Hong Kong to limewash 
their buildings on a recurring basis.87 The Tung Wah Hospital began to assume the task of 
monitoring the dumping of corpses in the streets and offered monetary rewards for reporting 
such actions.88 Members of the hospital committee and Chinese representatives of the 
Sanitary Board published regular notices in newspapers urging people to come to them to 
report any unjust treatment by government officials and abuse of power. Although there were 
continuous complaints over the sanitary regulations, these efforts seemed to have paid off to a 
certain extent, both by encouraging the tenement dwellers to come forward to voice their 
grievances as well as in strengthening their confidence in taking care of their own affairs. At 
the level of day to day practices, individuals responded positively to these initiatives, and 
their efforts of monitoring their own behavior also allowed them to identify Hong Kong as an 
increasingly ‘civilized,’ orderly city that they participated in making. Both at the time, and in 
the eyes of many later Hong Kong historians, the term ‘good government’ continued to work 
at the level of discourse, shaping narratives of the city and everyday life if not always fully 
reflecting the actual problems happening on the ground.  
 
Whatever its long-term successes, the campaign also garnered much respect for Governor 
Blake. This was evident in a petition to the Colonial Office by a large number of Chinese 
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pledging for an extension of his governorship in 1903.89 Referring to Blake as a ‘just, liberal, 
benevolent and sympathetic character’ whose shanzheng had greatly helped improve the 
livelihood of the people, the petitioners argued that it was all the more important for Blake to 
continue steering Hong Kong’s development in an uncertain period amidst emerging political 
crisis and rising anti-foreign sentiments in the China region.  Although these sorts of praises 
were not uncommon in Chinese practices in communicating with officials, they posed 
significant contrasts with some of the accusations against the governor by the local British 
merchants. These competing truth claims point to the rivaling rationalities deployed by 
different agents as well as the scaling out processes through which they sought to legitimize 
their positions by appealing to the larger networks of Empire.  
 
 
Advocating Justice: The Enquiry into the Administration of the Public Health and 
Building Ordinance  
 
At the same time that Governor Blake was being commended for his work in the 
improvement of sanitation and public health, there was, curiously, a concurrent series of 
investigations into corruption involving government officials at the Public Works and 
Sanitary Department.90  Capturing the most attention was an enquiry into the administration 
of a major public health and building legislation enacted at the end of Blake’s governorship. 
The enquiry was ordered by Blake’s successor Governor Matthew Nathan three years later 
after a large number of complaints related to the regulation of the ordinance were reported.91 
A closer look at the alleged corruption and the responses to the enquiry will shed some light 
on how these practices were developed and came to function as a specific kind of institution 
under colonial rule and how the enquiry was itself a means of buttressing the discourse of 
‘good government.’  
 
The legislation in question was the Public Health and Building Ordinance of 1903.92 When 
first enacted it was hailed as a major legislative achievement that finally ended two decades 
of struggle to introduce building regulations deemed necessary for improving public health.93 
As mentioned earlier, many of these regulations, which involved the provision of windows, 
backyards, and minimum space per person in domestic tenements, had long been resisted by 
Hong Kong’s property owners, who argued that they violated market principles and property 
rights. The 1903 ordinance was passed after the government agreed to provide compensation 
for the landlords to cover expenses incurred in the work required by the new regulations. 
However, this ‘grand concession’ soon proved to be unworkable due to the many 
contradictions between different clauses in the ordinance.94 And these legal ambiguities, 
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coupled with communication gaps between officials of varying ranks in different departments, 
provided many new opportunities for the abuse of power.95  
 
The enquiry was appointed by Nathan in 1906 and was carried out by a special commission 
consisting of European and Chinese unofficial members. The findings were published in a 
300-page report in 1907, confirming that ‘the administration of the regulations as carried out 
under the ordinance was most unsatisfactory’ and ‘irregularities and bribery were rampant 
within various government departments.’96 The report alleged that this network of corruption 
involved both Chinese subordinate workers as well as European inspectors, who allied with 
outside contractors to establish monopolies in building trades and construction works. These 
problems were revealed in the testimonies of a large number of property owners, who 
contended that they were forced to employ particular contractors recommended by 
government inspectors to carry the building work required by the ordinance. If they did not do 
so whatever was done would be deliberately destroyed by the inspectors and thus would have 
to be rebuilt.97 The commission reported that these arrangements applied to practically every 
kind of improvement work ranging from the construction of house drains and windows to the 
concreting of floors and limewashing of houses, with each linking to a ring of profiteers that 
encompassed coolies, contractors, foremen, inspectors and other clerks in the Public Works 
and Sanitary Department.  
 
Henry Lethbridge argues that petty corruption flourished in Hong Kong because the Chinese 
did not generally see these kinds of practices as ‘morally wrong.’ To many Chinese who 
migrated to the colony from the Mainland, petty corruption involving the offering of small 
payments to officials was largely a normal practice.98 Most Chinese in fact did not judge the 
conduct of an official on whether or not he accepted any ‘extra income,’ but on his ability to 
improve the livelihood of the populace and their material wellbeing. This perspective, which 
corresponded with the Confucian discourse of good government as discussed earlier in this 
paper, arguably played a role in shaping Chinese expectations of the behaviors of officials in 
colonial Hong Kong. Indeed, as the commission report acknowledged, because blackmailing 
was a matter of everyday occurrence in Mainland China, any Chinese who crossed over to the 
colony tended to accept this as in his own country. This phenomenon was evidenced in the 
testimonies of the property owners. While many complained about the extortions levied on 
them by sanitary inspectors, they nevertheless admitted they themselves would be perfectly 
willing to pay a small sum to subordinate officials to facilitate the granting of building 
certificates. Meanwhile, the ease in which officials were able to profiteer vis-à-vis the 
sanitary regulations in turn helped support complex networks within the building trade that 
involved many contractors, sub-contractors, artisans and laborers that were interrelated with 
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each other through kinship and were from the same localities in the Mainland. What one 
found in Hong Kong then, was an example ‘of how a Chinese guild oligopoly system 
transplanted to colonial soil and accommodated to the apparent exigencies of colonial law by 
a series of intelligent evasions.’99  
 
There was, however, one important difference. Unlike in Mainland China where irregular 
practices permeated officials of all ranks, in colonial Hong Kong they were largely confined 
to the lower level of the administration. This was because the higher-ranked administrators, 
including the governors, who were cadets trained in England and set on course for rapid 
promotion within the civil service, were unlikely to engage in petty corruption that involved 
small sums of money.100 Unlike their lower-ranked European counterparts who were recruited 
on the spot and were keen to make a better living for themselves, the cadets were conditioned 
by their training to regard the taking of bribes as immoral behavior. While the Hong Kong 
Chinese might not have expected ‘good officials’ to be ‘incorruptable,’ they were likely 
impressed by the conduct of the cadets, who gave credibility to the discourse of upholding 
justice and impartiality that was supposed to be the anchor of British imperial rule. And this 
also helps explain why the governors were successful, to a considerable degree, in separating 
themselves as a class above their subordinate officials. And indeed, the very exercise to 
appoint commissions with non-officials to investigate corruption within the administration 
presented a salient exception to Chinese practices, thereby contributing to a new conception 
of justice and a changed ‘political game.’  
 
It can be argued that this was the ultimate significance of these enquiries: that they became 
representations of the benevolent acts of the governor (who appointed the commissions) and 
provided a means of legitimation for the core members of the colonial administration. And it 
seems that this was quite effective despite the fact that the commission had done very little to 
eliminate corruption, which continued to proliferate at the lower levels of the administrative 
structure. The Chinese response to the work of these commissions can be seen in the 
newspaper Huazi Ribao, which published an elaborate, fourteen-part article following the 
release of the commission report in mid 1907.101 While the article condemned the ‘shameful 
conduct’ of European inspectors involved in corruption, it praised Governor Nathan for his 
shanzheng, which was epitomized by his decisive move to inquire into the problems out of his 
personal concern for the livelihood of the people.102 This construct of ‘governor as protector 
of the people’ was also consciously propagated by the commission members who conducted 
the investigation. Transcripts of the enquiries showed that witnesses summoned by the 
commissioners were repeatedly told that ‘the governor wanted to find out the truth and to 
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restore justice for the people… tell us the truth so that we could prosecute those who did 
wrong and bring matter to justice.’103 
 
While they exalted the governor’s benevolence and righteousness, the commission members 
also sought to associate themselves with him to underscore their own gongde. In particular 
the two Chinese unofficial members, Fung Wa Chun and Lau Chu Pak, who were both well 
known philanthropists and directors of the Tung Wah Hospital, made it clear that they were 
‘the mouthpiece of the governor,’ spoke the same language, and were devoted to advocate 
justice for the people.104 In fact, it can be argued that the appointment of a relatively high 
proportion of Chinese (2 out of 6) to the commission was itself also a conscious political 
calculation to present a sense of fairness, not only because the Chinese had by now become 
the largest property taxpayers in the colony, but also to give acknowledgement that more than 
two thirds of the witnesses (134 out of 185) summoned by the commission were Chinese.105 
The position of the Chinese commission members who generally saw themselves as a class 
‘morally superior’ to those of the poorer laborers was made clear in the ways they conversed 
with the various witnesses.106 While they were sympathetic towards the disadvantaged and the 
poor, vowing to protect them, they also carried a strong paternalistic attitude, making it clear 
to them that they were the authority vested with power. The transcripts of these conversations 
also showed that many irregularities were discovered via forceful questioning by the Chinese 
commissioners, who managed to persuade a number of witnesses to confess their 
wrongdoings through a combination of what could be termed ‘moral bullying’ and offers of 
promised benefits. At the same time, it is important to note that these detailed exchanges also 
suggest that those witnesses who admitted their crimes did not see themselves being coerced, 
but arrived at their decisions after weighing the potential consequences of their own actions. 
 
While Chinese merchants sought to shore up their positions as native leaders by showing their 
allegiance with the governor, those of the less advantaged classes, including coolies, 
contractors and government clerks, often allied themselves with European inspectors and 
other subordinate officials who shared with them the desire to make quick money through 
illicit means. These collaborative activities, in which each party was able to make some gains 
via different networks under the regulatory system, also helped to neutralize some of the 
tensions under a highly unequal colonial society. In this way then, the Chinese merchant 
elite’s efforts to position themselves as champions of gongde, and in this capacity as the 
legitimate leaders for the Chinese populace was a particular move within wider political 
struggles which included tensions within the Chinese community itself. The invocation of 
normative language and attempts at the regulation of conduct thus can be seen as a gesture in 
which the particular behaviors exhorted and marginalized were ultimately less important than 
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the alignment of different groups of actors that helped reinforce a hegemonic discourse about 
Hong Kong.  
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning here that while the work of the commission helped shore up 
political legitimation for the British administrators and Chinese elites and to an extent 
deflected criticisms against the actual dysfunctions of the regulatory system, it also provided 
an occasion for observers elsewhere to compare similar challenges in enforcing sanitary 
regulation with their own contexts and reflect on what constituted the most appropriate forms 
of government and roles of citizens. An example can be seen in an editorial published in 
Singapore’s Straits Time in July 1907, less a month after the release of the report on 
corruption in Hong Kong, and which also corresponded with a major report on the sanitary 
conditions of Singapore.107 By comparing the situations of several colonial cities, including 
Colombo, Calcutta and Hong Kong, the article urged for restructuring municipal organization 
in Singapore based on insights gained from these other localities. This example shows just as 
discourses originating elsewhere were continually being appropriated by local actors within 
Hong Kong, so were events in Hong Kong radiating outward through different scalar 
networks. 
 
 
Localism, Nationalism and the Narrations of ‘Civility’  
 
In hindsight, the irregularities uncovered by the commission should not have surprised 
anyone familiar with Hong Kong’s context because, as the commission report itself 
acknowledged, these practices had long been well known. Nevertheless, the wide publicity of 
the report incited new public debates over urban improvement, the protection of property 
rights and accountability of the government. While the English press used the occasion to 
condemn ‘officialdom’ and push for the establishment of a municipal council such as those 
already established in other British colonies, the Chinese press began to posit Hong Kong as a 
model of ‘good government’ of the kind that would help revive the declining Chinese 
nation.108 By way of conclusion, this last section provides some brief reflections on the ways 
in which Hong Kong was promoted by some Chinese as a ‘model’ for guiding China’s 
‘national development.’ Although these narratives utilized some of the key terms associated 
with the British ‘civilizing mission,’ they also articulated them in a language that fit with 
China’s historical and cultural context. Concepts such as ‘civility,’ ‘justice’ and ‘good 
government’ were invoked as long-existed Chinese attributes. Central to these invocations 
was a scaling practice through which Hong Kong was posited as a ‘Chinese society,’ which, 
with the openness established under foreign rule, had allowed the Chinese to become so 
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successful and to manifest their latent potentials as good citizens. While these kinds of claims 
were invested with nationalistic sentiments that were simmering elsewhere, they were 
predicated on a localism that distinguished Hong Kong as a distinct territory that was more 
advanced, modern and civilized.109  
 
At the time when the report on corruption captured the attention of the Hong Kong public, the 
local Chinese press was simultaneously occupied with news of a succession of natural 
disasters devastating Canton and the Guangdong province. Events in Guangdong had in fact 
always dominated the content of Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong, with a majority of the 
population continuing to relate to this part of China as their permanent homeland. And indeed, 
the close ethnic ties between Hong Kong and Guangdong and the fluid movement of people 
and capital between the two territories had long contributed to a strong regional identity that 
somewhat weakened the relation to Hong Kong as a separate colonial polity.110 This 
perspective was reflected in the orientation of the newspapers, where political critiques were 
mostly directed towards the Chinese authorities in Guangdong and the Mainland rather than 
the British administration in Hong Kong. And the fact that many Cantonese in this region had 
prospered through external trade activities under British tutelage had also given them a sense 
of superiority over ethnic groups in other parts of China. At the same time, the strong 
connections of the merchant elites to authorities of power in the Mainland also made the 
former see their destinies as lying not so much in the hands of ‘foreigners’ but with their own 
countrymen. These complex ethnic, regional and international affiliations of different scales 
played significant roles not only in shaping the self-image of the Hong Kong Chinese, but 
also their participation in the ongoing construction of political discourses pertaining to the 
new Chinese nation.  
 
As discussed earlier, wealthy Chinese merchants in Hong Kong had from early on engaged in 
philanthropic activities through which they displayed their gongde and affirmed their claim to 
moral leadership within the local community. In time, these activities extended beyond the 
colony to encompass the raising of relief funds for natural disasters and other social services 
in the Mainland and overseas.111 So when the news of a serious flood broke out in Guangdong 
in the summer of 1908, the Hong Kong philanthropists jumped into action by organizing a 
series of fund raising events to help the relief efforts. These events, which were heartily 
supported by the colonial administration, provided a perfect occasion for the Hong Kong 
Chinese to demonstrate their generosity and benevolence and present Hong Kong as an 
advanced, wealthy and ‘civilized’ territory that garnered a great sense of pride amongst the 
community. 
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An example of such exaltations can be seen in the reports of a three-day charity fair held in 
July 1908. The fair was organized by the colony’s most prominent Chinese leaders and were 
supported by all the European merchants. As reported in the Huazi Ribao, it was by far the 
most elaborate event of such kind in Hong Kong’s history and the first organized solely by 
Chinese.112 The importance of the event was conveyed in the lengthy editorials and 
commentary pieces devoted to describing minute details of the fair, including the elegant 
design of its venue, the orderliness of its organization and the generosity of its participants. It 
also noted the governor’s gracious commendation of the Chinese for having organized an 
event that represented Hong Kong’s civility and progress that made it thoroughly comparable 
to any ‘advanced Western nation.’ 
 
Throughout 1908 the Huazi Ribao continued to run with contrasting articles. On the one hand 
were critiques directed toward the Qing government for its indifference to the plight of 
Guangdong (for it did little to help) and lambasting the corruption and inefficiency of 
Mainland officials. On the other were writings on the emerging idea of ‘Cantonese civility,’ 
along with praise for how the ‘generosity and industriousness’ of the Cantonese people in 
Hong Kong and Canton made them become so successful and admirable. For much of the 
1900s Hong Kong had been caught up in the unstable atmosphere instigated by political crisis 
in the Mainland with anti-foreign boycotts that spilled over from Guangdong. And yet 
throughout this time the British governors enjoyed wide support amongst the local Chinese 
population.113 Indeed, as the quotes from Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese reformers at the 
beginning of this paper indicate, many revolutionaries seem to perceive Hong Kong as a land 
of civility and progress despite colonial domination. While many descriptions, such as that 
exhibited in the charity event, exulted in the colony’s orderly nature, it was seen as a result of 
a smooth combination of British administration and Chinese entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, 
similar proclamations could be found in the English press, though with the emphasis that 
these were ultimate proofs of success of the colonial civilizing mission.  
 
Notwithstanding all the claims that associated Hong Kong with modernity and progress, it 
must be noted that many Chinese in the colony held a relatively conservative view of society. 
Although some merchants elites supported political reform in China and denounced foreign 
imperialism, they adhered to the Confucian discourse of social hierarchy and paternalism that 
helped enhance their prestige and social positions.114 On the ground, the Chinese elites were 
in a relatively cozy relationship with the British officials and European merchants. There 
were tensions, and yet their close political and economic ties and unfolding prosperity made 
some go as far as wholeheartedly supporting transforming China under British tutelage. As 
Tsai has pointed out in his analysis of the social relations in early Hong Kong, the Chinese in 
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the colony were not necessarily ‘less nationalistic’ than their counterparts in the Mainland and 
likewise wanted to see the emergence of a strong Chinese nation. However, their specific 
historical experiences made them view the path to get there differently. The gaps between 
these worldviews, shaped by discrepant economic development of the two territories, became 
even wider as China underwent further political upheavals and social unrest in the later 
periods. 
 
This ambivalent attitude towards both the colonial state and the Chinese nation continued to 
play a key role in shaping the self-image of the Hong Kong Chinese and their relations with 
each other. As discussed earlier, there was an persistent irony in the history of Hong Kong: 
that despite it being seen as more prosperous and modern than other territories in Mainland 
China, the stability of the colony was based in part on a deep conservatism developed under 
the colonial policy of cultural relativism. The revival of ‘local traditions’ and emphasis on 
Chinese cultural values had helped engender a sense of pride and solidarity amongst different 
classes of people that fed readily into a divided colonial society. The idea that Chinese were 
able to govern themselves under foreign rule, and that despite all odds they were still able to 
become successful also strengthened a strong belief in individual upward mobility. In contrast 
to the ‘transient migrant’ discourse that saw the Chinese as apathetic subjects, it is argued 
here that all constituencies played a self-conscious role in the shaping of colonial governance. 
This view of the Chinese as participating, governing subjects also connected two aspects in 
the study of governmentality raised in the introduction of this special issue: the ways in which 
authorities seek to shape the conduct of subjects, and the multiple ways in which people came 
to regulate their own actions.  
 
Despite the mutual dependence of the Hong Kong administration and the Chinese 
constituency, it remained a territory with few formal elements of representative government 
until the end of colonial rule.115 While British officials frequently praised the Chinese for their 
‘public spirit’ and philanthropic works, this did not alter the longstanding rhetoric that Hong 
Kong remained a ‘land of transience’ and that its people were ‘too centered on their self 
interests’ to be given self-rule. The contradictory alignment of interests and discourses, 
shaped by networks of authorities at different scales, namely the colonial, the ‘local’ the 
regional, as well as imaginaries of an emerging Chinese nation, allowed Hong Kong to 
remain as a distinct territory that was in a sense ‘suspended’ outside of China, yet continued 
to affiliate with it and acted as its closest mirror in the eyes of many Chinese on both sides of 
the border. Central to these relations, as I have tried to illustrate throughout this paper, is a 
discourse of good government and benevolence linked with the Confucian values of 
shanzheng and gongde. This discourse was actively promoted by different agents through 
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ongoing moralizations taking place at multiple domains, which were at the core of an 
arrangement that at once bolstered aspects of Chinese power, but simultaneously acted as a 
powerful frame for the (self)regulation of norms and everyday conduct that helped maintained 
colonial rule.  
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